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Jordan's New "Political Development' Strategy 
Anne Marie Baylouny 
1 'We have a problem here. There is no real [opposirion] 
party except for the Muslim Brotherhood." 1 So an 
official of Jordan's new Ministry of Political Devel-
opment and Parliamentary Affairs summed up the raison d'etre 
of his place of employment. 
The formal goals of the ministry created in December 2003 
are to create strong parries that endorse King Abdallah Il's vi-
sion of "Jordan First"; to increase the political participation 
of women and youth; to advance democratic d ialogue and 
respecr for the opinion of ochers, including judicial reform; 
and to promote a responsible press which serves the objectives 
of the Jo rdanian state and its people and represents the vision 
of change.2 This is not some US-sponso red project, ministry 
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officials repeatedly assert, anricipating the cri ticisms of a suspi-
cious popularion. They are righr: rhe m inisrry in fact represents 
the Jordanian regime's attempt to build a base of long-term 
support wh ile avoid ing substantive political liberalization . 
Remaking the Opposition 
The very groups that helped the regime ward off dissent in 
the past- "ethnic Jordanians" from the East Bank versus 
Palesti nians and Islamists versus the left- have suddenly 
become potential opponents. While some faul t the new 
king, i t was his father, King Hussein, who bred the curren t 
difficult ies. Relying on East Ban k tribal leaders and the 
Islamists, H ussein ignored rural economic development 
even as he signed an unpop ular peace treaty with Israel in 
1994. Islamists now preach against the regime's fo reign poli-
cies, while the tribes have been steadily deprived of their 
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sinecures in the public sector. The neo-liberal economic 
policies of King Abdallah have further eroded the state's 
ability to promise secure employment to Jordanians of East 
Bank origin. 
The regime realizes that it needs an opposition. The Political 
Development Ministry continually declares it wants to hear 
all opinions, that political development means freedom of ex-
pression. 3 Demands must be institutionally channeled, so the 
populace feels it has a voice. H owever, the regime rejects the 
current oppositional institutions in Jordan. Political parties, the 
ministry feels, should be non-religious and non-ideological. Pro-
fessional associations, religious groups, women's and university 
groups, cultural and sports clubs should all be non-political and 
uninvolved in political platforms, erasing decades in which these 
organizations served as substitute forums for outlawed political 
parties. The minister of political development is making the 
rounds of all these groups, explaining the negative effects of 
politicization and interference of "external" forces. 
Instead of what al ready exists, according ro the head of 
the ministry, the king envisions three parties: right, left and 
center.4 To this end, the regime-supporting press devotes full-
page articles to parry members of old- leftist Baathists, Arab 
nationalists and even communists.5 Turning the previous policy 
on its head, and recalling maneuvers of Anwar al-Sadat during 
the 1970s, the left is now promoted to combat the right. 
The previous privileged role of the right and religious groups 
is accordingly being reevaluated. Religious preachers, says the 
official Jordan First pamphlet, should concentrate on advising 
Jordanians on their daily lives and leave politics to those more 
qualified and specialized in the task. "Religion cannot take 
the role of the state, police, security ... . They cannot say that 
normalization is forbidden-the state has already ruled on it. 
For decades now, religious sermons do nor tell the truth. They 
preach fairy tales and unscientific theses."6 The army, however, 
is exempt from the educational visits of the Political Develop-
ment M inistry, since it is believed to be non-political. 
Youth, Education and Computers 
A major focus of the ministry is on youth. "The older genera-
tion is already gone, but the ministry can educate the young 
to adhere to the rule oflaw in all circumstances. We will try to 
bring the tribes along, to educate them as we go," a ministry 
official explained. The ministry sets its goals in conjunction 
with the Ministry of Education in order to inculcate civility 
and create youth who respect the government's laws. 
To this end, a combined USAID and Jordanian program seeks 
to revamp the educational system. The Education Reform for 
Knowledge Economy project is intended to make Jordan a model 
of education reform and a regional information technology hub, 
reminiscent ofUSAID's private sector remodeling project in the 
1980s. 7 At that time, Jordan was used as a laboratory or "rest" for 
USAID's revised approach to private sector development, intend-
ed to strengthen business organizations and create a flourishing 
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private sector. That the previous effort met with lictle S'~ 
has not deterred this new education reform program bang~ 
of the broadest in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Education reform is designed to tackle the problem or ~ 
memorization and lack of analytical thinking in the education 
system, as well as inadequate teacher training, schools and eqrn?-
ment. Computers will be integral ro all phases of education in this 
project, and teachers will be trained in their use.8 £-learning will 
also be included. Key ro the new curriculum will be incentiYes 
for girls' participation, and school-to-work programs. Several US 
companies have already been identified to rewrite the curriculum. 
The World Bank committed over srno million in loans to the ef-
fort, while the majority of USAID's contributions, almost s400 
million, are in grants. The reforms parallel King Abdallah's plans, 
announced soon afi:er his ascension to the throne, to make Jordan 
an information technology (IT) center. 
One major problem is making schooling relevant to the 
needs of the labor market. What the labor market needs, how-
The very groups that backed the 
regime in the past have sud-
denly become suspect. 
ever, is unknown, a fact USAID acknowledges. They suggest 
immediately contracting a study to determine the answer. What 
labor market is being discussed-domestic or regional- is an-
other issue. While hopes for a flourishing Jordanian IT industry 
permeate the discussion, m uch of the higher education system 
has been geared toward regional labor markets, with expatriate 
workers in the Gulf countries sending their earnings back home. 
The domestic market is dominated by a weak service industry, 
retail businesses, public sector employment and, now, export 
processing zones. Early childhood education is another prior-
iry. This will focus exclusively on kindergarten, for ages four 
ro six. Kindergarten is now dominated almost entirely by the 
private sector, mostly run by charitable or non-governmental 
village or family associations. 
There is little public knowledge of what the reforms precisely 
email. Indeed, the question of popular participation in the 
new curriculum has been sidestepped. While poli tical debate 
rages in the United States over the issue of sex education in 
the classroom, Jordan's education reform can simply contract 
the development of "youth reproductive health messages" for 
the new curriculum. 
The project's public reception has been mixed. The Wesrward-
looking middle class believes it will bring computers into the 
schools and create a system akin ro the US school system, which 
they observe closely for clues as to their children's brighter future. 
Others think the new curriculum is designed ro "adjust" the 
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teaching of the religious schools, remove extremism and delete ref-
erences co "the Zionist enemy." Islamist groups protest the changes, 
claiming they represent the creeping imposition of American 
values.9 This negative attirude coward the educational changes 
has gained increased currency in the climate of the Iraq war, as 
any initiative by the Jordanian government is suspected of being 
Women enter the new vision 
of Jordan at the sewing ma-
chines of the export processing 
zones. 
authored on American orders (bi-amr Amrika). "Tell America 
co let up on us on the schooling," said one professional woman 
who had been in favor of the changes when interviewed in 2004. 
"We need our education system to improve for the global world," 
she stated back then, fending off criticisms from others chat the 
changes would decrease coverage of Islam. Now, she and many 
others have d1anged their assessment of US-associated changes. 
Women and Rural Export Zones 
Women are the ministry's ocher main focus. In February 2003, 
before the parliamemaiyeleccions of that year, che king decreed 
a new law establishing a quota of six women in parliament's 
lower house. While women are formally encouraged to be a 
regime-supporting pillar, their participation is "managed" by 
the regime, which creates quasi-official women's organizations, 
and controls or marginalizes existing ones.1° Further, ro empower 
women as a bloc might require challenging the de facto base of 
the regime in conservative East Bank tribes and fam ilies. As the 
highly publicized women's campaign ro end the honor crimes law 
demonstrates, the regime restricted the movement's activities, 11 
and ultimately subordinated women's demands ro its need ro 
maintain tribal support. No monarchical decree amended the 
law, as occurred for other issues lacking public support. 
The promotion of women migh t appeal to Westernized 
urban Jordanians, and certainly to the international com-
muni ty. Substantively, it is not seriously supported by the 
regime. H owever, the focus on women provides ai d from 
international agencies chat continue targeting women for 
funding and micro-financing. Once rhe money is allocated 
by these agencies, it is often used for different purposes. 12 
Micro-loans are provided to women's organizations to estab-
lish themselves and purchase transportation, and to engage 
in embroidery, sewing and growing za'tar (thyme). But these 
activities remain disconnected from market demands, and 
thus selling rhe products is d ifficult. 
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In reality, women enter the new vision of Jordan at the 
sewing machines of the export processing zones. In a factory 
building of rhe Century group in northern Jordan's Q ual ify-
ing Industrial Zone (al-H asan Industrial Estate), around 100 
veiled women, married and single, sew indigo blue Calvin 
Klein women's thongs and blue and purple Gap bras. Ocher 
sewing lines stitch for Hugo Boss, Nike, JC Penney, Old Navy, 
Tommy Hilfiger and Victoria's Secret. 
Goods produced at the al-H asan Industrial Estate are ex-
clusively for export ro the United Scares, as per a deal with 
Washington, and cannot be sold on the domestic marker. The 
deal with Washingron allows Jordan to export the products o f 
the Qualifying Industrial Zones to the US duty- and quota.-
free, provided that the products have a pre-specified minimum 
percentage of value added from each of the participants in che 
deal- in Jo rdan's case, 12 percent from Jordan and 8 percent 
from Israel. This provision means chat many of che labels on 
the bras and thongs sewn in northern Jo rdan say Made in Is-
rael. Recently, Victoria's Secret began labeling their garments 
Made in Jordan. 
The companies in Jordan's roughly 12 industrial zones are 
mostly East Asian, mainly Taiwanese and C hinese. Some are 
Israeli or Turkish; veiy few are Jordanian-owned. Managers of 
Israeli companies leave daily affairs ro Jordanian o r East Asian 
line supervisors, since incidents involving lsraelis disciplining 
Jordanian women workers came ro light. The political goal of 
creating good will between rhe rwo parries has not panned out. 
The Israelis Ay in ro check on their businesses and Ay out the 
same day. Even government personnel obligated ro attend func-
tions with the Israelis prefer the Chinese, Pakistani or Indian 
managers and do not feel friendly coward the Israelis. 
The zones are dominated by the textile industry, and staffed 
largely by women. 1he labor for some zones was in itially 
brought in from China and Southeast Asia. In the highesr-
producing zone, 6,ooo of 16,ooo workers are C hinese, Fi lipina 
or Bangladeshi women. Despite the complaints of manag-
ers that Jordanian labor is inferior, Jordanian labor has now 
taken up half or more of the work in the zones. 13 Most of the 
facto ries are closed to outs iders and inspection. The labor is 
low-paid, with no minimum wage enforcement or oversight 
for uearment (cases of severe abuse are reported periodically 
in papers). Even if the bras and thongs they sew could be sold 
in Jordan, the seamstresses could not afford them. 
Many Jordanian women are bused in from the surrounding 
counttyside, up ro an hour away. To work in these zones, the 
women rely on inexpensive child care services. In the fac to1y 
mentioned above, 25 women use the industrial zone's own nurs-
ety for their children, while many others put their children in 
nurseries in their home villages. Many of these nurseries, includ-
ing that in this industrial zone, are unregistered and unregulated. 
Only now has the supervising ministty drawn up minimum 
safety and health guidelines for nurseries, which have yet ro be 
implemented. The initial standards are basic, such as locating the 
nursery away from busy streets and intersections, and furnitu re, 
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kitchen and bathroom requirements. The best nurseries in the 
counuy, according to the supervising official, were only average. 14 
Nurseries are not included in the education reform initiative, 
since they serve children under four years old. 
To draw labor into an industrial zone in Amman, a program 
was copied from East Asia, bringing women and girls from 
rural areas for stretches of two weeks at a time. A bus rakes 
them home after that period for one day, and collects them 
again. While on the industrial estate, they stay in dormitories. 
H alf the participants failed to return after the first period of 
work after the program was introduced. 
At the macro level, the export zones create employment and 
generate export revenue, but their effects on the local economy 
are ambiguous. To the US embassy and Jordanian government, 
they create growth, provide an inflow of money and empower 
women . Visitors to the US embassy, including State Depart-
ment official and vice presidential daughter Elizabeth Cheney, 
tour the zones. The premise that this employment will empower 
women relies on a simple equation of money with power, a 
formula not substantiated even in areas with long histories of 
formal female employment. Money does not by itself alter the 
underlying system of patriarchy. Such an assumption also ig-
nores the potential backlash from unemployed male relatives. 
Women may be employed, but the problem of male unem-
ployment, particularly in the rural areas, remains. In the end, 
no matter how much the zones add to stability and growth, 
their success may well be temporary. Firms locate in Jo rdan for 
access to the US market, and that advantage will end with the 
termination of the Multi-Fiber Agreement in 2005. 15 
The Future of the Regime 
More importantly, the dynamic of women working in these 
zones while the state detaches itself further from the provi-
sion of social services has left child care in the hands of the 
private sector. In rural areas, the private provision of child 
care is almost exclusively in the hands of non-governmental 
organizations organized along village or kinship lines. In 
line with increasing rural female employment, the demand 
for child care services has skyrocketed in those areas, a trend 
not observed in the urban areas. N urseries and kindergartens 
have increased particularly near the export processing zones. 
These child care facilities are necessary for women to put their 
young children while they themselves work, officials at the 
zones stated. According to the head of the nurseries section 
of the Social Development Ministry, the extended family is in 
serious decline and not available as a resource for many rural 
working women. 
Instead of extended families aiding in caring for children, 
broad kinship groups are now in charge of child care provision. 
Private associations providing child care are part of a large-scale 
societal trend of organizing along redefined village and kinship 
lines. Classified as voluncary civil society associations, they use 
kinship idioms, often altered from prior kin understandings. 
As the state withdraws from social welfare provision, these 
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associations redistribute welfare, jobs and social services such 
as child care within the circumscribed network. In only rare 
cases do associations aid non-kin or non-members. 
State-level incentives encouraged organizing along tribal or 
village lines, ind irectly incorporated into the state through mu-
nicipal leaders. The state receives incernational aid to support 
the organizations. Subsidies are provided for the establishmenc 
of child care facilities by these organizations, which were given 
preferencial treatmenc over women's or Islamist organizations. 
By default and through decentralizing administrative changes, 
the populace is encouraged to seek aid from local village or 
family groups. While the associations are society-based and 
not governmenc creations, they lack the bargaining power vis-
a-vis the state often attributed to grassroots or neighborhood 
associations. Recently announced local elections will further 
this policy of incorporating local Jordanian authorities, now 
in charge of municipal welfare services, while discarding the 
mass of the Jordanian population that previously formed the 
regime's base of support. 
As part of Jordan's attempts to generate new and loyal con-
stituencies in economic liberalization, the Political Develop-
ment Ministry focuses on fostering youth who obey laws and 
advancing women as symbols of progress and modernity. But 
women are effectively a front for the real policy of rerribaliza-
tion. Regime actions demonstrate that its real p illars are local 
leaders and reorganized families, which it now provides with 
incencives via decencralization, along with a reinvigorated and 
heavily financed military. Subordinate and detached political 
parries are sought that present no threat to the regime's ongo-
ing state of semi-authoritarianism. The retribalization of civil 
society will only further this trend. While at the grassroots level 
these kin and m unicipal associations may be democratic in 
practice (at least for males), their relation to the state precludes 
them from being an effective force for democratization. • 
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